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DECIPHERING AND DEFENDING THE  
EUROPEAN UNION’S NON-BINDING CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 
JAMESON ROHRER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, the United States’ chief negotiator at the Conference on 
Disarmament asserted that the interests of all spacefaring states were 
sufficiently shielded by the “existing multilateral arms control regime.”1 
Despite their “groundless” fears, he said, “[t]here simply is no problem in 
outer space for arms control to solve.”2 The U.S. representative to the 
United Nations General Assembly (U.N.G.A.) First Committee on 
Disarmament and International Security echoed the sentiment in 2006, 
adding that the real threat is “not some theoretical arms race in space, but 
[anything] that would deny peaceful access to and use of space.”3 And 
again, in 2007, the U.S. insisted that the “real threats” were “those to the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime,” not a space-based arms-race, which 
certainly needed no “new agreements.”4 
This last assertion came months after China successfully tested a 
ground-based ballistic missile against one of its satellites.5 Headlines such 
as “Star Wars’ Missile Test Heralds New Arms Race in Space”6 and “A 
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 1.  Eric Javits, Ambassador, Conf. on Disarmament, Remarks on Outer Space at the Conference 
on Future Security in Space (May 29, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0205/doc17.htm).  
 2.  Id.  
 3.  U.S. Opposes Restrictions on Use of Space, SPACE DAILY (Oct. 26, 2006), 
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/US_Opposes_Restrictions_on_Use_Of_Space_999.html. 
 4.  Robert Joseph, Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control & Int’l Sec., The George C. Marshall 
Institute, The U.S. National Space Policy, at The Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy 
(Dec. 13, 2006).  
 5.  Peter Spiegel & James Gerstenzang, Chinese Missile Strikes Satellite, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2007, at A1.  
 6.  Tim Reid & Jane Macartney, ‘Star Wars’ Missile Test Heralds New Arms Race in Space, 
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New Arms Race in Space”7 indicated that much of the world was 
unconvinced. But even in 2008, when China and Russia campaigned for a 
treaty to ban weapons from space, the U.S. staunchly “opposed any treaty 
that sought ‘to prohibit or limit access to or use of space.’”8 
This paper will analyze threats to satellites, such as cascading orbital 
debris and armed anti-satellite attacks, as well as solutions—primarily, the 
European Union’s draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities—
proposed to allay them. It shall begin by noting the complexity of the 
orbital environment, the economic and strategic importance of that 
environment, and the natural and human threats to the orbital satellite 
infrastructure (primarily, that of the United States, unquestionably the 
nation most invested in and reliant upon outer space). After surveying the 
current legal and political playing field, this article will analyze the new 
Code of Conduct draft, its potential to minimize the risk of orbital 
catastrophe, and the United States’ response to it. Finally, this article shall 
consider the Code’s potential to change how nation-states treat the orbital 
environment—perhaps through slow crystallization into customary 
international law (CIL)—and then compare the non-binding Code to other 
proposed solutions. 
II. THE FALLING SKY 
A. Complexity and Importance 
Around 1,100 active satellites currently orbit the Earth.9 They travel 
endlessly through increasingly dense toroid clouds formed from 22,000 
tracked objects10 and “hundreds of thousands of additional objects too 
small to track” (but still big enough to seriously harm satellites or space 
stations).11 “[T]he most useful orbits have also become the most 
congested.”12 
 
LONDON TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at 2.  
 7.  A New Arms Race in Space?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2007, at 10.  
 8.  Nick Cumming Bruce, U.N. Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, but U.S. Still Objects, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A11.  
 9.  BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT 
FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES: STRENGTHENING LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY, STABILITY, SAFETY, 
AND SEC. IN SPACE (Jan. 17, 2012) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
 10.  See id.; see also AIAA Position Paper on Space Debris: 30 Years On, ORBITAL DEBRIS 
QUARTERLY NEWS (NASA, Hous., Tex.), Oct. 2011, at 2.  
 11.  FACT SHEET, supra note 9.  
 12.  Michael W. Taylor, Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a Time: Earth’s Orbital Debris 
Problem, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).  
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Many satellites share civilian and military functions.13 These functions 
are often generated by the same physical technologies, which evolve 
quickly; for example, commercial satellites in 1997 possessed imaging 
resolution of 1 kilometer or greater—useful for environmental monitoring 
and scientific research, but less tactically potent than modern DigitalGlobe 
and GeoEye satellites, which, a decade later, possessed “resolutions as low 
as 0.5m.”14 Peaceful applications, which multiply as satellite technology 
develops, include “mapping, remote sensing, and natural disaster 
prevention”; the very same devices can be used, even simultaneously, for 
“targeting, surveillance, and operational communications relay.”15 These 
benefits “permeate almost every aspect” of modern civilian life—they 
augment street navigation, further scientific observation, multiply and 
reinforce communications, monitor emerging crises both human and 
natural, and “provid[e] global access to financial operations.”16 A single 
satellite’s loss can cripple an entire communications technology and 
hamstring economic or government transmissions.17 In short, “[s]pace is 
vital to protecting U.S. economic prosperity and . . . national security 
interests.”18 
Since the 1960s, the U.S. military has invested heavily in the strategic 
exploitation of outer space.19 The Air Force developed satellite 
technologies to gather and organize military intelligence before and in 
reaction to armed conflict.20 The United States initially built these 
programs with nuclear war in mind,21 but Desert Storm and Desert Shield 
forced satellite technology to evolve.22 “The seventy satellites that were 
 
 13.  Cynthia Zhang, Do As I Say, Not As I Do—Is Star Wars Inevitable? Exploring the Future of 
International Space Regime in the Context of the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy, 34 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 422, 445-46 (2008); David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary 
International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1194 
(2009).  
 14.  Michael J. Noble, Export Controls and United States Space Power, 6 ASTROPOLITICS 251, 
253 (2008). GeoEye-2 will have a resolution of 25 cm. Id.  
 15.  See Anand Mohan, Legal Issues in the Deployment of a Dedicated Satellite for the Indian 
Navy, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 25, 45 (2009).  
 16.  FACT SHEET, supra note 9.  
 17.  See Zhang, supra note 13, at 443-44 (Pan Am satellite’s malfunction “rendered 89% of the 
forty-five million beepers in use in America inoperative [and] delayed financial transactions and direct 
broadcast transmissions.”) 
 18.  FACT SHEET, supra note 9.  
 19.  See, e.g., CURTIS PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER: THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND THE 
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM 15-26 (1997).  
 20.  See, e.g., DANA J. JOHNSON ET AL., SPACE: EMERGING OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL POWER 38 
(1997).  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Craig Covault, Desert Storm Reinforces Military Space Directions, AVIATION WK. & SPACE 
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ultimately brought to bear against Iraq [in the first Gulf War] provided the 
United States . . . with ninety percent of its strategic intelligence and 
carried seventy percent of all transmitted data for coalition forces.”23 Since 
then, the Unites States has grown strategically dependent on a small 
number of crucial communications satellites. In 2011, then-Deputy 
Secretary of Defense William Lynn said: 
The willingness of states to interfere with satellites in orbit has serious 
implications for our national security. Space systems enable our modern 
way of war. They allow our warfighters to strike with precision, to navigate 
with accuracy, to communicate with certainty, and to see the battlefield 
with clarity. Without them, many of our most important military 
advantages evaporate.24 
Consequently, satellites present hard-to-reach but tempting targets for 
would-be aggressors.25 
B. The Threat 
In March 2009, a chunk of debris travelling at 35,000 kilometers per 
hour menaced the International Space Station (ISS), forcing the crew to 
shelter in a Russian escape capsule.26 The object, left from an U.S. rocket 
launched almost two decades before, missed,27 but it was “the second time 
in less than a year that space debris threatened the ISS.”28 Countless 
collisions and near-misses to satellites, ballistic missiles, and orbiters 
demonstrate the scale of this problem.29 Useful space, and the existing 
technological infrastructure that exploits it, is in constant danger from junk 
 
TECH., Apr. 8, 1991, at 42. 
 23.  Dean Cheng, China’s Military Role in Space, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2012, at 55, 59.  
 24.  William J. Lynn, III, A Military Strategy for the New Space Environment, WASH. Q., Summer 
2011, at 7,7.  
 25.  See, e.g., James P. Finch & Shawn Steene, Finding Space in Deterrence: Toward a General 
Framework for “Space Deterrence”, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Winter 2011, at 10, 12(“This asymmetry 
creates an imbalance; the more a nation relies on space systems, the more tempted a potential adversary 
is to target those systems.”); see generally Cheng, supra note 23. “[All] sides recognize that ‘space has 
become the primary location for global and regional reconnaissance assets used for . . . intelligence 
gathering, and support of combat operations on the earth’s surface.’ It is therefore logical for [all] sides 
to try to exploit space for their own ends while denying it to opponents.” Id. at 73 (quoting JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT (2012)).  
 26.  Traci Watson, Space Junk Forces Crew to Scram: Astronauts Enter Escape Pod in Case 
Debris Hit Station, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 2009, at 2A.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a 
Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 595 (2011).  
 29.  Mark J. Sundahl, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime, 
24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 129-30 (2000); see also Koplow, supra note 13, at 1202-08.  
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in orbit, along with a host of other “man-made threats.”30 These can easily, 
and without warning, “deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy” crucial 
satellite assets.31 Critically, these threats linger. Objects in lower Earth orbit 
can remain for anywhere between a few months and tens of thousands of 
years.32 Objects in geosynchronous Earth orbit, with a surprisingly limited 
number of optimal positions “highly coveted” by weather and 
communications satellites, can orbit “anywhere from one million to ten 
million years.”33 Worse, generally accepted scientific models warn that 
“the unhindered increase in space debris will, within ten to fifty years, 
create a cascade of collisions threatening sustainable space access.”34 The 
resulting destruction could cost billions of dollars35 and completely block 
human access to orbit for centuries or longer.36 
While most orbital collisions were unpredictable accidents, several 
nations have the power to intentionally destroy satellites in orbit—and they 
have. Since the 1960s, Russia and the United States have possessed anti-
satellite (ASAT) weaponry, primarily in the form of “guided air-launched 
missiles.”37 Debris from a U.S. ASAT test in 1985 orbited the earth until 
2002.38 Since that test, the United States and the Soviet Union have both 
placed moratoria on ASAT tests, and have conducted none since.39 
In 2006, President George Bush issued a National Space Policy that 
“reject[ed] any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to 
operate in and acquire data from space,” promised to defend the Unites 
States against any who would restrict it, and threatened to “deny, if 
necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national 
interests.”40 In January 2007, China responded41 by testing an anti-satellite 
 
 30.  FACT SHEET, supra note 9.  
 31.  See id.  
 32.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 6.  
 33.  Id. at 6-7.  
 34.  Imburgia, supra note 28, at 607; see also, e.g., Taylor, supra note 12, at 18.  
 35.  Imburgia, supra note 28, at 607.  
 36.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 20.  
 37.  Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Bloodless Weapons”? The Need to Conduct Legal 
Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of Defining Them as “Weapons,” 66 A.F. L. REV. 
157, 173 (2010).  
 38.  Id. at 173-74.  
 39.  Id. at 174.  
 40.  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY (2006), at 1-2.  
 41.  See, e.g., Todd Barnet, United States National Space Policy, 2006 & 2010, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
277, 282 (2011); Zhang, supra note 13, at 430-31; see also Jacob M. Harper, Technology, Politics, and 
the New Space Race: The Legality and Desirability of Bush’s National Space Policy Under the Public 
and Customary International Law of Space, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 681, 698-99 (2008) (acknowledging that 
while “the [2006 National Space Policy] may be legal, it may also incite extraterrestrial violence”).  
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missile. In addition to breaking the two-decade ASAT-test cease-fire, this 
also created millions of pieces of orbital debris.42 Three years later, China 
demonstrated the refinement of their ASAT capabilities and 
communication satellite sophistication by coordinating and observing—in 
real-time, but from space-based sensors: “two geographically separated 
missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision.”43 Later in 2010, 
they “deliberately maneuvered” two microsatellites into close proximity44 
and made them “bump[]” each other.45 The United States showcased an 
ASAT weapon of its own, deploying an Aegis-LEAP SM-3 interceptor 
missile to neutralize a spy satellite’s potentially hazardous contents.46 
Though satellites do not bleed, ASAT warfare is not bloodless; ASAT 
attacks “may well leave a financial sector in ruins; seriously disrupt the 
provision of medical and emergency services to the sick and injured, or 
those in distress; endanger safe air, rail, and marine navigation; silence the 
press and provide misinformation; [and] undermine the government, 
including its national defense posture.”47 
C. Star Wars 
While there is still “no legal barrier to placing conventional weapons 
in space,”48 typical ASAT weapons strike from Earth—terrestrially based 
ASATs require far less technological infrastructure than orbital weapons 
and carry a correspondingly lower price tag.49 The United States’ rejection 
in 2008 of the Chinese/Russian orbital-weaponization-ban treaty draft 
represented one more U.S. step in the accelerating ASAT race.50 Kinetic 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Frank Morring, Jr., Worst Ever; Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Boosted Space-Debris 
Population by 10% in an Instant, AVIATION WK. & SPACE. TECH., Feb. 12, 2007, at 20,; Leonard 
David, China’s Antisatellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Encircles Earth, SPACE.COM, Feb. 2, 2007, 
available at http://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-encircles-
earth.html.  
 43.  China: Missile Defense System Test Successful, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2010, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-11-china-missile-defense_N.htm.  
 44.  Cheng, supra note 23, at 64.  
 45.  William Matthews, Chinese Puzzle, DEFENSE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100906/DEFFEAT01/9060317/Chinese-Puzzle. 
 46.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 174-75.  
 47.  Id. at 160-61.  
 48.  Zhang, supra note 13, at 440 (citing PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, POSTNOTE MILITARY USES OF SPACE, 2005-6, H.C. H.L. 273, available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/POST-PN-273 [hereinafter 
Military Uses of Space]).  
 49.  See Phillip Saunders et al., China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-
Satellite Weapons, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (Jul. 22, 2002), 
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020722.htm. 
 50.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 192-94. The Conference on Disarmament, the draft 
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ASATs, also called mass-to-target weapons, employ “routine technology 
and materials to destroy targets through impact.”51 These need not generate 
incredible debris, as the 2007 Chinese ASAT test did52; the United States’ 
2008 emergency strike against its hazardous spy satellite was engineered 
by NASA and the Pentagon to burn all resulting debris in the atmosphere.53 
The scheme was successful, and the (minimal) debris was gone from orbit a 
year later54—most of it within one hour.55 Alternatively, these weapons can 
be designed to maximize hazardous debris in certain orbits, turning crucial 
orbital toroids into kinetic minefields.56 The resulting threat could produce 
widespread damage and would exist until the debris had fallen from 
orbit57—a period which could last for thousands of years or more.58 ASAT 
attacks need not look like weapon strikes at all; co-orbital and 
microsatellite ASAT devices, possessed by Russia and possibly China as 
well, attack by maneuvering very close to their targets and either 
detonating powerfully, colliding at speed, or disrupting their targets’ 
paths.59 In some cases, co-orbital ASATs can cause satellite collisions 
without any party (other than the aggressor) truly knowing the attack was 
an attack.60 However, traditional surface-to-orbit kinetic attacks produce 
visible thruster burns and inevitably leave tangible evidence.61 Given such 
a strike’s seriousness, a nation would probably only use an ASAT in self-
defense or if it “anticipate[d] and accept[ed] a wartime response.”62 
Several nations are also developing non-kinetic directed energy 
weapons (DEWs).63 The U.S. favors them over kinetic ASATS,64 and 
 
treaty’s recipient, requires consensus “even on agenda setting”; any American opposition scuttles it. 
Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 194-95. 
 51.  Zhang, supra note 13, at 450.  
 52.  See Morring, Jr., supra note 42.  
 53.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 175.  
 54.  Jim Wolf, U.S. Satellite Shootdown Debris Said Gone From Space, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2009 
1:38 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/27/us-space-usa-china-
idUSTRE51Q2Q220090227.  
 55.  Satellite Breakups During First Quarter of 2008, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS QUARTERLY NEWS, 
April 2008, at 2.  
 56.  Jan Kallberg, Designer Satellite Collisions from Cover Cyber War, STRATEGIC STUDIES 
QUARTERLY, Spring 2012, at 128-29.  
 57.  Id. at 129. 
 58.  See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.  
 59.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 176. 
 60.  See id. at 176.  
 61.  Kallberg, supra note 56, at 128.  
 62.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 176. 
 63. Id. at 177.  
 64.  E.g., Koplow, supra note 13, at 1264. However, “when confronted in 2008 with the risks 
posed by the failing USA-193 satellite, the U.S. authorities responded by attacking it with a missile, not 
ROHRER MACRO PROOF 11//21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:58 PM 
194 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:187 
Russia, China, Germany, and the United Kingdom likely have DEW 
capabilities as well.65 DEWs can burn or irradiate their targets, but even 
low-energy laser DEWs can temporarily blind satellite sensors.”66 DEWs 
operate at the speed of light, can have an invisible beam, leave no munition 
fragments, and can be designed to generate no debris.67 In short, a DEW’s 
characteristics allow an attacker to “convincingly deny any involvement 
with the destruction it causes.”68 
Satellites are, like any complex, fragile, computer-driven 
communications machine, susceptible to electromagnetic pulses, uplink and 
downlink jamming,69 and “cyber attacks[,] aimed at either satellite systems 
or their terrestrial control elements.”70 Cyber warfare has been employed 
meaningfully against civilian terrestrial targets in Estonia and Georgia, 
with results “potentially just as disastrous as a conventional attack.”71 
“China has had a growing interest in building cyber warfare capabilities 
and is one of several nations that would have a sincere interest in degrading 
US space assets.”72 Of all known antisatellite tools, a cyber attack is the 
hardest to attribute to an individual attacker73 and the most difficult to 
definitively classify as an armed attack (in order to unlock Article 51 rights 
of inherent self-defense).74 “Yet, conceivably, a series of space and 
cyberspace attacks could render a military force and its individual units 
relatively blind, deaf, mute[,] and lost (without access to satellites for 
position, navigation[,] and timing) without using anything traditionally 
regarded as military ‘arms.’”75 
 
a laser.” Id.  at 1264. 
 65.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 179 (citing Major General David Scott & Colonel David 
Robie, Directed Energy: A Look to the Future, AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Winter 2009, at 4).  
 66. Id.  at 177.  
 67. Id. at 178-79.  
 68.  David Hambling, US Boasts of Laser Weapon’s “Plausible Deniability”, NEWSCIENTIST.COM 
(Aug. 12, 2008 3:45 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn14520-us-boasts-of-laser-weapons-
plausible-deniability.html. However, a ground-based laser would be quite hard to hide. Zhang, supra 
note 13, at 451.  
 69.  Michel Bourbonniere, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or 
ius in bello satellitis, in SPACE LAW 528, 529-30 (Francis Lyall & Paul B. Larsen eds., 2007).  
 70.  Cheng, supra note 23, at 67.  
 71.  Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Netwat: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in 
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193 (2009). 
 72.  Kallberg, supra note 56, at 131 ) (citing Kim Zetter, Hackers Targeted U.S. Government 
Satellites, WIRED, Oct. 27, 2011, available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/ 
hackers-attack-satellites/) (other citations omitted).  
 73.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 183.  
 74.  Id. at 187. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.  
 75.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 183. 
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II. THE LAWS OF HEAVEN 
Any international best-principles compact governing this area must 
lean heavily on existing “treaties, conventions, and other commitments 
relating to outer space activities.”76 Since 1958, the U.N.G.A. Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOUS) has guided, drafted, and 
implemented the suite of legal instruments organizing orbit.77 COPUOUS 
created the Outer Space Treaty,78 the Liability Convention,79 the 
Registration Convention,80 the Moon Treaty,81 and the Rescue Treaty.82 
“These five treaties . . . form the basis of international space law.”83 
A. The U.N. Charter 
The U.N. Charter theoretically limits state behavior “on, under, and 
well above the planet”; it “knows no geographical limitations” and 
overrides obligations imposed by all other treaties.84 Under the Charter, 
“without some valid justification such as self-defen[s]e under Article 51, or 
authorization by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII, first use of 
military power in outer space, like its counterpart on Earth, is per se 
illegal.”85 However, a subscribing state subjected to an armed attack may, 
 
 76.  2010 Draft, infra note 196, at 6. The European Union’s most recent Code of Conduct draft not 
only “reaffirmed [its drafters’] commitment to the existing legal framework,” 2010 Draft, infra note 
196, at 6, but outright strove “to promote universal adoption of, and full adherence to, [those] 
instruments.” 2010 Draft, infra note 196, at 7. 
 77.  Colby C. Nuttall, Comment, Defining International Satellite Communications as Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: The First Step in a Compromise between National Sovereignty and the Free Flow of 
Ideas, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 389, 394 (2005).  
 78.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 
205 [hereinafter OST]. 
 79.  Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 
24 U.S.T. 2389, T 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
 80.  Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 
695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
 81.  Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 
18, 1979, 18. I.L.M. 1434.  
 82.  Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue 
Treaty].  
 83.  Zhang, supra note 13, at 434 (citing Andrew Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space 
Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 Hous. J. 
Int’l. L. 871, 876 (2006)).  
 84.  THOMAS GRAHAM, The Current Legal Regime Governing the Use of Outer Space, in 
SAFEGUARDING SPACE FOR ALL: SECURITY AND PEACEFUL USES 87 (United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research ed., 2004).  
 85.  Id. at 88 (referencing U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4).  
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under Article 51, act in individual or collective self-defense.86 “This may 
reasonably be seen as extending to the space-based military assets of a 
nation.”87 Obviously, such nations must observe the international principles 
imposed by the generally accepted Law of Armed Conflict,88 Geneva 
Convention,89 and Hague Convention,90 which, in short, require “that the 
use of military force cannot be indiscriminate, but instead must be guided 
by the principles of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality.”91 
B. 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (OST)92 
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) “remains the key legal framework 
governing space security. It has been ratified by over 100 states,”93 
including the U.N. “and all major space-faring countries.”94 Scholars 
regularly deem it the “Magna Carta” of space law.95 The OST is 
permanent.96 It requires States Parties exploring and using orbit and beyond 
to respect “the interests of all countries”97 and conduct themselves 
accordingly, “undertak[ing] appropriate consultations before proceeding”98 
if they have reason to believe that their activities, or those of their 
nationals, would negatively interfere “with activities of other States 
Parties.”99 States Parties are “internationally liable for damage” that any 
part of their satellites cause to the property and persons of other States 
Parties, regardless of where that damage occurs.100 The OST explicitly 
 
 86.  U.N. Charter art. 51.  
 87.  Mohan, supra note 15, at 43.  
 88.  Bourbonniere, supra note 69, at 529.  
 89.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention]. 
 90.  Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention].  
 91.  Mohan, supra note 15, at 44.  
 92.  OST, supra note 78.   
 93.  Zhang, supra note 13, at 435.  
 94.  Graham, supra note 84, at 88.  
 95.  E.g., Detlev Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law 19 (2006); 
Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. 
REV. 1, 74 (2000) (quoting N. Jasentuliyana, The Role of Developing Countries in the Formation of 
Space Law, XX:II ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 95, 97 (1995).  
 96.  Graham, supra note 84, at 88.  
 97.  OST, supra note 78, art. I.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. art. IX.  
 100.  Id. art. VII.  
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forbids States Parties from denying access or use to other states101 or 
claiming sovereignty over any portion of it.102 Signatories must not install 
or test weapons on or fortify the Moon or other celestial bodies (which 
must remain usable “exclusively for peaceful purposes”), and must not put 
weapons of mass destruction into orbit at all.103 (Most States Parties tend, 
of course, to interpret the “peaceful purposes” standard as meaning “non-
aggressive,” not “non-military.”)104 
The OST does not prohibit the orbital deployment of non-WMD 
weapons or armed spacecraft, habitats, or stations, much less their creation 
or maintenance on Earth.105 It does not restrict the launch of nuclear-
equipped devices that do not fully orbit the Earth or even forbid WMD 
testing in outer space, although subsequent treaties limit both of these 
activities.106 One of the OST’s prevailing themes is accountability; 
spacefaring nations, for better or for worse, forever “retain jurisdiction and 
control” over their satellites whose registry is carried 107 and remain 
“internationally liable for damage” they cause to other subscribing states.108 
C. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (Liability Convention)109 
The Liability Convention holds spacefaring states “absolutely liable to 
pay compensation for damage caused” by their satellites and their 
components, whether in heaven or on Earth.110 The Convention “base[s 
liability] on a simple negligence standard”; States Parties are only liable for 
damage for which they, or those for whom they are responsible, are at 
fault.111 If a subscribing state’s satellite is damaged in space, it may “seek 
compensation through the [L]iability [C]onvention mechanism,”112 which 
involves a compensation claim ground through the machinery of diplomacy 
to the offending state,113 or “through the courts or administrative forums 
 
 101.  Id. art. I.  
 102.  Id. art. II.  
 103.  Id. art. IV.  
 104.  Graham, supra note 84, at 89.  
 105.  Id. at 89-90.  
 106.  See id. at 89-94.  
 107.  OST, supra note 78, art. VIII.  
 108.  Id. art. VII.  
 109.  Liability Convention, supra note 79.  
 110.  Id. art. II.  
 111.  Craig A. Smith, Legal Considerations of International Space Operations, 6 HIGH FRONTIER 
No. 2, Feb. 2010, at 40 (citation omitted).  
 112.  Id. at 42.  
 113.  Liability Convention, supra note 79, art. IX.  
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available in the offending state.”114 Of course, in order to bring a claim 
under the Liability Convention, a state must identify the subscriber who 
caused damage.115 
D. 1976 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(Registration Convention)116 
The Registration Convention “was based on the belief that a 
mandatory system of registering objects in space would assist in their 
identification.”117 The Convention helps document all objects launched into 
orbit by subscribing states.118 In a timely fashion, signatories must submit 
reports announcing the general function of any object launched, its 
registration number, the “[d]ate and territory or location of launch,” and the 
object’s initial “basic orbital perimeters.”119 However, “[i]t is common 
practice for nations to ‘kick boost’ their satellites to different orbits and 
locations for any variety of reasons, including operational security [and] 
secrecy . . . . Moving satellites in such a manner does not conflict with the 
reporting requirements of the Registration Convention.”120 This practice 
greatly decreases the ability of hostile nations to target satellites, but for the 
same reason, badly muddles the quality of the registry’s data, dramatically 
increasing the odds of accidental collision.121 
E. Interpretation and Analysis of Satellite-Attack Law 
If a satellite fails, whether due to collision caused by negligence or an 
intentional armed attack, to legitimately and effectively respond a nation 
must first be able to identify both the cause of the event and the entity 
responsible.122 ASAT weapons can be incredibly subtle, so space 
situational awareness (SSA) is absolutely necessary to unlock either 
traditional diplomatic and legal remedies or Article 51 rights of self-
defense.123 Given the complexity of Earth’s orbital environment,124 this is 
easier said than done. Once the responsible state is identified, the wounded 
 
 114.  Smith, supra note 111, at 42 (citing Liability Convention, supra note 78, art. XI). 
 115.  See generally Liability Convention, supra note 79.  
 116.  See Registration Convention, supra note 80.. 
 117.  Smith, supra note 110, at 40 (citation omitted).  
 118.  See Registration Convention, supra note 80, art. III, art. IV. 
 119.  Id. art. IV.  
 120.  Mohan, supra note 15, at 40. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  See Smith, supra note 111, at 40-41.  
 123.  See id. at 40 (quoting Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, Aug. 2, 
2004, ch. 3, 19-20). 
 124.  See, e.g., id.; see also supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.  
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party must overcome the next herculean obstacle: justifiably classifying the 
event as an armed attack, a negligent act, or a wholly blame-free 
collision.125 
If the event was an intentional or hostile blow struck by another 
state,126 the wounded party will likely deem it prudent to act through 
diplomatic or economic channels, possibly seeking compensation through 
the Liability Convention.127 However, a military response, depending on 
the harm caused and a nation’s standing rules of engagement and ability to 
conclusively identify the attacker, may be in order.128 A direct kinetic 
attack (as opposed to a co-orbital kinetic strike or a cyber attack) would be 
comparatively easy to identify, likely turning international political will 
against the offender.129 While the United States, China, and Russia are 
unlikely to ever agree on “punitive actions [the others] propose[] in the UN 
Security Council,” a kinetic attack of any sort would inevitably provide the 
wounded state with casus belli sufficient to enable some sort of Article 51 
response.130 Given that spacefarers such as the United States, Russia, and 
China would be highly unlikely to employ indiscriminate kinetic weapons 
because of the harm they would deal to their own orbital infrastructures, 
and that rogue nations would also likely choose other options in order to 
avoid massive collateral damage to potential political allies, any 
unprovoked kinetic strike would invite fierce retribution. DEW attacks, if 
recognized at all, would necessarily include beams leading directly back 
toward the aggressor.131 As with kinetics, DEW strikes would constitute 
acts of war, although the minimization of collateral debris damage might 
slightly reduce international outrage. Similarly, cyber attacks would not add 
clutter to orbit unless specifically engineered to cause collisions.132 
However, as most investigations into suspected cyber attacks “end with a 
set of spoofed innocent actors whose digital identities have been exploited 
in the attack rather than attribution to the real perpetrator,”133 this is likely 
 
 125.  Smith, supra note 110, at 41.  
 126.  If, on the other hand, a non-state actor outside the wounded state’s territory launched an 
armed attack, viable response options “are limited and attribution is even more difficult.” Military 
action is, depending on the wounded party’s LOAC analysis, sometimes possible. However, it is far 
more likely that the only plausible reaction is diplomatic pressure against the state from which the actor 
operated. Id. at 41-42.  
 127.  Smith, supra note 111, at 40.  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Kallberg, supra note 56, at 129. 
 130.  Id. at 129-30. 
 131.  See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 177-79.  
 132.  Kallberg, supra note 56, at 130-32. 
 133.  Id. at 131.  
ROHRER MACRO PROOF 11//21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:58 PM 
200 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:187 
to be moot; most wounded nations would lack the evidentiary strength to 
respond in self-defense. 
If a spacefaring state needed to target the satellite of another in self-
defense (whether responding to an attack on its own satellite, making a 
terrestrial crisis zone more safe, or in anticipation of bloodshed), it must 
surely consider the principles of necessity, discrimination, and 
proportionality. If an ASAT attack fails this test, it must not be made.134 
First, because “[a] military attack in space that creates orbital debris has the 
potential to cause harm to the satellites of every state in the world,” any 
attack that meets the discrimination prong must “be carefully planned to 
limit the amount of debris created.”135 Necessity might dictate choices 
between available ASAT weapons136—if the state has a perfectly 
satisfactory DEW, it needs not (and should not) opt for the damage 
potential of a kinetic kill device. 
Proportionality requires consideration not only of the strike’s damage, 
but of the target’s loss.137 DEWs and cyber weapons minimize damage 
from debris, but while “a purely military satellite is a legitimate target 
because it enhances an enemy’s war fighting capability,” many satellites 
are dual-use, and require significant analysis—their extraordinary military 
value could be outweighed by extraordinary civilian dependency.138 Some 
scholars assert that, while dual-purpose satellites require graver 
consideration in the discrimination and proportionality analyses, they are 
legitimate targets nonetheless.139 Others conclude that the nonmilitary 
functions of these targets mandate a balancing test, weighing a satellite’s 
military “percentage capacity” against the civilian costs of “destruction or 
denial.”140 At least one scholar has compared dual-purpose satellites to 
“non-combatant hospital ship[s],” suggesting that both “aid[] a country’s 
war fighting capability,” both “provide[] a humanitarian service for persons 
hors d’combat,”141 and both have military purposes “indistinguishable from 
or inextricably intertwined with [their] civilian role[s].”142 The Law of 
Armed Conflict grants immunity to a hospital ship, and in this analogy, 
perhaps dual-purpose satellites should be immune to attack as well.143 
 
 134.  See generally Hague Convention, supra note 90; Bourbonniere, supra note 69, at 529. 
 135.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 22.  
 136.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1248. 
 137.  Id. at 1246-47. 
 138.  Mohan, supra note 15, at 44; see also Koplow, supra note 13, at 1246-47. 
 139.  Bourbonniere, supra note 69, at 532-33. 
 140.  See, e.g., Mohan, supra note 15, at 45. 
 141.  Id. at n.96. 
 142.  Id. at n.97. 
 143.  Id. at 45.  
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III. SPACEFARERS 
“[T]here are approximately sixty nations and government consortia 
that operate satellites, as well as numerous commercial and academic 
satellite operators”144; at least twelve spacefaring states have the 
“indigenous capacity” to launch them.145 Many more nations, including 
Brazil, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, and South Africa, have made spacefaring 
capability a priority.146 “In concert with this rapid growth in national space 
participation, there exists commensurate internationalization of the space 
industry.”147 
A. China 
In the 21st Century alone, China created “an indigenous navigation 
system (Beidou),” sold “a Chinese-built satellite to a foreign buyer,” and 
demonstrated to the rest of the world its innovation and reach.148 At the 
same time, China successfully deployed a high-resolution imaging satellite, 
several manned spacecraft, a lunar probe, and, most controversially, fully 
functional anti-satellite weaponry.149 Although both before and after its 
ASAT test China campaigned against the use of weapons in space,150 “the 
military’s role in China’s space program should not be underestimated”; 
the People’s Liberation army oversees and steers China’s outer-space 
development.151 New programs include space-debris tracking systems, 
debris shields for spacecraft, and improvements to space-debris collision 
simulations.152 
China knows that disrupting U.S. satellite power neutralizes many 
otherwise overpowering military advantages.153 China saw satellite use in 
the Gulf War as “a big step forward in both military theory and practice,”154 
 
 144.  Fact Sheet, supra note 9.  
 145.  Noble, supra note 14, at 253; FACT SHEET, supra note 9. 
 146.  Imburgia, supra note 28, at 606. Others include Algeria, Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, and 
Thailand. Id.  
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Matthew D. Burris, Tilting at Windmills? The Counterposing Policy Interests Driving the 
U.S. Commercial Satellite Export Control Reform Debate, 66 A.F. L. REV. 255, 304-05 (2010).  
 149.  Id. at 304.  
 150.  See, e.g., Cumming-Bruce, supra note 8, at A11.  
 151.  Cheng, supra note 23, at 64.  
 152.  Id. at 65.  
 153.  See, e.g., Ashley J. Tellis, China’s Military Space Strategy, 49:3 Survival 41, 45 (2007); 
Cheng, supra note 23, at 58-59; see generally Frank M. Walsh, Forging a Diplomatic Shield for 
American Satellites: The Case for Reevaluating the 2006 Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-
Satellite System, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 759 (2007) (predicting satellite-warfare roles in legal and military 
conflicts with China).  
 154.  Shi Yukun, Lt. Gen. Li. Jijun Answers Questions on Nuclear Deterrence, Nation-State, and 
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and by 2002 determined, perhaps witnessing the NATO’s use of satellites 
in the Balkans, that the “space battlefield” would impact all others.155 Over 
the next ten years, the importance of controlling outer space and disrupting 
opponents’ satellite infrastructure to gain “information superiority” became 
internalized in Chinese military strategy.156 “[M]ilitary space operations are 
often discussed in the context of the need to obtain information or to deny 
it to an opponent.”157 Once, the United States attempted to check the 
growth of China’s space program through export controls and other 
information restrictions.158 The Chinese program has matured to the point 
where that sort of coercion is no longer possible.159 
B. India 
India watched the Chinese ASAT test intently, and in 2008 announced 
“plans to develop a military space program” to protect its satellites.160 G. 
Madhavan Nair, chair of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), 
“labeled the test ‘unethical’ because it created debris that endanger[ed] 
other satellites.”161 He also maintained that while India was committed to 
“peaceful use of outer space,” it had ASAT capabilities as well.162 
Certainly, India is developing its ASAT capability; it openly seeks “to deny 
the enemy access to its space assets” and “eliminate enemy satellites 
operating in low-earth orbits.”163 The Indian Navy and the ISRO have had 
satellite launch capabilities since 1982 and are limited more by their budget 
than technological barriers.164 Currently, the ISRO struggles to deploy 
Rohini, a dedicated military communications satellite capable of “real-time 
surveillance and targeting.”165 Though Rohini is critical to the Navy’s 
tactical vision,166 ongoing equipment failures have delayed the satellite’s 
 
Information Age, CHINA MILITARY SCIENCE 3 (1995).  
 155.  Cheng, supra note 23, at 60.  
 156.  Id. at 62.  
 157.  Id. at 66.  
 158.  See generally CHRIS COX, THE COX REPORT: THE UNANIMOUS AND BIPARTISAN REPORT OF 
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY COMMERCIAL 
CONCERNS WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Kenneth de Graffenreid ed., 1999). 
 159.  Cheng, supra note 23, at 72.  
 160.  David R. Sands, China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space, WASH. TIMES (June 25, 2008), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/25/china-india-hasten-arms-race-in-space/?page=all.  
 161.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1241.  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  India’s “Satellite Killer” to Take on China, MSN NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010) 
http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3517606.  
 164.  Mohan, supra note 15, at 29-30.  
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id.  
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“much-awaited launch” until the end of 2012 at the earliest.167 Since 1975, 
India has complied with the typical suite of outer-space treaties and shows 
every indication of continuing.168 Additionally, India is part of the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), “an international 
forum of governmental bodies for the coordination of activities related to 
the issues of man-made and natural debris in space.”169 
C. Japan 
In 2008, Japan “br[oke] a decades old ban on the use of the nation’s 
space assets for military purposes.”170 Previously, scholars supposed that 
Japan’s “constitutional prohibition against offensive military capabilities” 
and tight defense budget would have kept it from the outer-space arena.171 
Japan has, however, created and applied orbital debris mitigation and 
minimization policies.172 Moreover, Japan’s Prime Minister was the only 
official to condemn outright China’s 2008 ASAT test.173 
D. Russia 
Russia condemned the United States’ 2006 National Space Policy, 
decrying its challenge to other nations’ access to orbit and deeming it “the 
first step toward a serious deepening of the military confrontation in 
space.”174 This stance reflected decades of Russian foreign policy. “The 
former Soviet Union had originally sought to completely demilitarize outer 
 
 167.  Rajat Pandit, Military Satellite Delayed Again by a Year, TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 13, 2011, 
4:47 AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-10-13/india/30274617_1_gsat-7-satellite-
indian-space-research-organization. 
 168.  Mohan, supra note 15, at 40.  
 169.  INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMM., IADC SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION 
GUIDELINES, IADC-02-01 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.iadc-online.org/docs_pub/IADC-
101502.Mit.Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter IADC Guidelines]. The Guidelines reiterate many of the 
principles and practices expressed by the Code of Conduct, see infra note 196 , and recommend 
standardized Space Debris Mitigation Plans as well as risk-minimizing spacecraft designs; Mohan, 
supra note 15, at 46-47.  
 170.  Barnet, supra note 41, at 281 (citing Koplow, supra note 13, at 1193); see also Yomiuri 
Shimbun, Japan: Ban Lifted on Use of Space for Defense, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.fourwinds10.com/siterun_data/space/space_exploration/news.php?q=1220217912 (“Under 
the ban, the use of space by the Self-Defense Forces was limited to technologies for a missile-defense 
system and information-gathering satellites.”).  
 171.  E.g., Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based 
Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 384 (2004).  
 172.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 36-37.  
 173.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1241.  
 174.  Russian Official Sharply Criticizes Assertive New U.S. Space Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Nov. 29, 2006.  
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space,”175 and in 1981 attempted to “impose a blanket ban on stationing 
weapons in space.”176 In recent years, it has allied itself with the Chinese 
campaign against outer-space weaponization,177 domestically forbidden 
“the creation of orbital debris,” enacted a debris-mitigation policy, and 
developed the second-best debris-tracking system in the world.178 
Regardless of its attitude, Russia certainly possesses dedicated ASAT 
capabilities, which may include the ability to “maneuver[] one satellite into 
the orbital path of another in an attempt to cause a collision.”179 
E. United States 
“The radical concentration of the world’s defense industrial sector . . . 
allows the United States a powerful role within the larger international 
system.”180 Accordingly, less than an hour after inauguration, President 
Barack Obama released a new national defense policy which promised to 
“restore American leadership on space issues” and prohibit ASATs 
worldwide.181 His 2010 National Space Policy echoed that purpose, seeking 
to strengthen the commercial space sector and “assure the use of space for 
all responsible parties.”182 It outlined six goals: (1) “[e]nergize competitive 
domestic industries” to collaboratively improve U.S. spacefaring 
capabilities; (2) “[e]xpand international cooperation” by fostering a 
peaceful international spirit of discovery and information exchange; (3) 
“[s]trengthen stability in space” with clear domestic and international 
enforcement mechanisms for safe, clean, transparent outer-space 
operations; (4) “[i]ncrease assurance and resilience of mission essential 
functions” by fortifying every sort of U.S. outer-space instrumentality 
against “disruption, degradation, and destruction,” regardless of cause; (5) 
“[p]ursue human and robotic initiatives” to advance scientific 
understanding of the cosmos; and (6) “[i]mprove space-based Earth and 
solar observation” to sharpen weather, climate, and disaster monitoring and 
 
 175.  Zhang, supra note 13, at 427 n.24 (citing Wolter, supra note 95, at 11.)  
 176.  Id. (citing S. Neil Hosenball, Present and Prospective Military Technologies and Space Law: 
Implications of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, in INT’L SEC. DIMENSIONS OF SPACE 219 (Uri Ra’anan & 
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. eds., 1984)).  
 177.  See, e.g., Cumming-Bruce, supra note 8.  
 178.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 36. 
 179.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 176.  
 180.  Stephanie G. Neuman, Power, Influence, and Hierarchy: Defense Industries in a Unipolar 
World, 21 DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS 105, 127 (2010).  
 181.  THE WHITE HOUSE, THE AGENDA: DEFENSE (Jan. 30, 2009), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20090130030931/http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/. 
 182.  THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (June 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf.]  
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management.183 The 2010 National Space Policy strode toward 
international consonance, replacing “the forceful and nationalistic tone” of 
President Bush’s 2006 National Space Policy with a stance that 
acknowledged “the fundamental importance of cooperation and trust.”184 
In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence incorporated the tenets of the National Space Policy into the 
National Security Space Strategy.185 The unclassified summary outlined 
several Strategic Approaches to meet U.S. “national security space 
objectives,” and committed the United States to developing and following 
internationally recognized standards and practices186; improving space-
program efficiency, redundancy, resilience, and communication187; 
bolstering relationships with “responsible nations, international 
organizations, and commercial firms” and building upon their existing 
technological platforms when possible188; relying on diplomacy, 
redundancy protections, and intelligence collection to avoid and deter 
attacks189; and “develop[ing] mission-effective alternatives . . . for critical 
capabilities currently delivered primarily through space-based 
platforms.”190 
The United States continues to impose strict strategic export controls 
“which treat commercial satellite technologies, related technical data, and 
defense services as munitions subject to the strictest export control 
criteria.”191 These restrictions were born in the Cold War,192 but U.S. 
policymakers remain fearful that development of comparable satellite 
technology by other nations could drive “a whole new frontier in global 
terrorism”193 and eventually feed satellite-destruction capability to nations 
such as Iran.194 However, the United States’ position within the defense 
sector “affords the U.S., the most prodigious defense spender in the world, 
a tremendously large carrot with which to dangle before potential 
 
 183.  Id. at 4.  
 184.  Barnet, supra note 41, at 285-86.  
 185.  U.S. Dep’t. of Def. & U.S. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, NATIONAL SECURITY 
SPACE STRATEGY UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY (Jan. 2011).  
 186.  Id. at 5-6. 
 187.  Id. at 6-7. 
 188.  Id. at 8-9. 
 189.  Id. at 10.  
 190.  Id. at 11. 
 191.  Burris, supra note 147, at 257. 
 192.  See, e.g., id. at 259. 
 193.  The Export Administration Act: A Review of Outstanding Policy Considerations, Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Rep. Michael E. McMahon). 
 194.  See, e.g., Burris, supra note 147, at 282. 
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antagonists to U.S. export control policy.”195 As outer space grows 
increasingly multipolar, the United States seems to be, “at least with regard 
to [satellites], opting for a conciliatory approach—forging consensus 
through concession”196 instead of returning to its Bush-era unipolar stance. 
IV. SCOPE AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROPOSED CODE OF 
CONDUCT 
A. Purpose 
In 2010, the Council of the European Union released an updated draft 
Code of Conduct for outer space activities.197 These guidelines, revising a 
2008 draft,198 “aim[ed] to strengthen[] the security of activities in outer 
space.”199 Rather than controversially decrying an orbital arms race, the 
Code’s effects-based approach sought the minimization of harmful debris, 
regardless of source.200 Many powers collaborated and consulted in the 
Code’s creation—the EU prioritized acceptance by as many states as 
possible.201 The United States involved itself heavily, seeking “to reduce 
the potential threat to U.S. space assets by endorsing nonbinding best 
practices and transparency and confidence-building measures.”202 
In its first sentence, the Code admonishes that “all States should 
actively contribute to the promotion and strengthening of international 
cooperation relating to the activities in the exploration and use of outer 
space for peaceful purposes.”203 Its very next statement, highlighting the 
global importance of outer-space activities, represented a major shift from 
the 2008 draft: where two years earlier the EU was only convinced that 
outer space activities had “important consequences” inbound,204 the 2010 
drafters proclaimed that the importance of these activities could now be 
 
 195.  Id. at 288.  
 196.  See, e.g., id. at 289.  
 197.  Council Conclusions of 27 September 2010 Concerning the Revised Draft Code of Conduct 
for Outer Space Activities (EC) No. 14455/101, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cmsUpload/st14455.en10.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Draft]. 
 198.  Council Conclusions on the Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities as Approved 
by the Council on 8-9 December 2008 (EC) No. 17175/08, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf [hereinafter 2008 Draft].  
 199.  2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 2.  
 200.  Blake & Imburgia, supra note 37, at 193-94. 
 201.  See id.  
 202.  Rose Gottemoeller, A Code for Outer Space, as Seen from the State Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2012, at A26. At the time, Ms. Gottemoeller was Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security. 
 203.  2008 Draft, supra note 197, at 3; 2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 3. 
 204.  2008 Draft, supra note 197, at 3. 
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observed, measured, and felt205—they were no longer theoretical, and 
neither was the need to maximize and protect them. Though it repeated the 
goals and priorities of its predecessor, the 2010 draft unambiguously 
confirmed that debris “constitutes” a major danger, adding language 
recognizing “the need for greater transparency and better information 
exchange” and a coherent, security-oriented code of “best practices” to be 
adopted by all spacefarers for “all types of outer space activities.”206 It 
reiterated longstanding treaties and scientific and legal principles, then 
promised to protect “freedom of access to space for peaceful purposes” (as 
the OST guaranteed), the continued well-being of “objects in orbit,” and 
states’ “legitimate defense interests.”207 
Neither draft’s “purpose, scope, and core principles” contains any real 
surprises—both are voluntary mechanisms which aspire to commit their 
subscribers to security, safety, and transparency.208 Their differences are 
more interesting. Where the 2008 draft would codify, 2010 simply 
endorses; where 2008 hopes for predictability, 2010 strives for 
sustainability; where 2008 seeks to benefit all spacefarers, 2010 focuses on 
their activities.209 In short, the 2008 draft begins with a wish for a better 
tomorrow; the 2010 draft takes a distinctly less ethereal stance and moves 
to organize today. 
B. Principles and General Measures 
The Code’s subscribers pledge to prioritize and promote the standards 
and practices perpetuated by a number of high-profile treaties. These 
include, of course, the OST, the Liability Convention, and the Registration 
Convention.210 The Code also demands “reaffirmed commitment to” a host 
of other treaties and principles.211 Interestingly, the 2010 draft presents a 
loftier goal than the Code did in 2008; where before its drafters sought 
“universal adherence to”212 these treaties, the 2010 draft prioritized not only 
adherence to but “universal adoption” of them as well.213 The invocation of 
these agreements reinforces themes that reverberate throughout the Code’s 
General Measures and beyond. Again and again, the Code stresses the 
 
 205.  See 2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 3. 
 206.  Id. at 4.  
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id. at 5.  
 209.  Compare 2008 Draft, supra note 197, at 5, with 2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 5. 
 210.  2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 6.  
 211.  Id.  
 212.  2008 Draft, supra note 197, at 8.  
 213.  2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 7 (emphasis added).  
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importance of “tak[ing] all reasonable measures” to ensure safety, 
transparency, and sustainability.214 Because accidents of a kinetic nature are 
the likeliest, most destructive, and have the longest-enduring consequences, 
the Code prioritizes minimization of collision risk.215 Even more 
dramatically, at some point between 2008 and 2010, drafters decided that 
subscribing states’ self-imposed ban on “intentional destruction” of 
satellites warranted its own section—the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines of COPUOUS, previously squeezed between the other driving 
principles,216 received special attention and emphasis in the 2010 draft.217 
But the 2010 draft’s most explicit updates came in the sections 
describing cooperation mechanisms and organizational aspects. Echoing 
the increasingly corporeal preamble, 2010’s Code of Conduct presented 
simple but specific standards for its subscribing states to adopt: 
information-sharing and notification of—now, to both subscribers and non-
subscribers—space-object launch, potentially risky maneuvers, “high-risk 
reentry events” and the malfunctions that could cause them, and imminent 
or contemporaneous “collisions, break-ups in orbit, and any other 
destruction of space objects generating measurable orbital debris.”218 
Subscribing states would biennially meet, nominate a “central point of 
contact,” centralize relevant data in a subscriber-only “electronic database 
and communications system,” annually share strategies and objectives, be 
obligated to consult with any subscribing state potentially impacted by their 
activities, and commit to eliminating risk and mitigating damage; 
additionally, they could create a “reliable and objective” legal mechanism 
to investigate accidents.219 Consultation and information-sharing through 
these policies and procedures would minimize accidents and maximize 
accountability. Most substantially, the Code’s subscribers must pledge not 
to directly or indirectly destroy or damage any objects in outer space unless 
for “imperative safety considerations” or “debris mitigation.”220 However, 
the 2010 draft added to these justifications “the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter.”221 
 
 214.  Id. at 5-8. 
 215.  See id. at 7-8.  
 216.  2008 Draft, supra note 197, at 8.  
 217.  2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 8.  
 218.  Id. at 9-10.  
 219.  Id. at 9-12.  
 220.  2008 Draft, supra note 197, at 8; 2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 7.  
 221.  2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 7.  
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C. The United States’ Response 
On January 17, 2012, in press-statement form, Secretary of State 
Hillary Rodham Clinton announced the United States’ alignment with the 
principles of the Code of Conduct.222 She recognized the danger debris 
posed to “the long-term sustainability of [the] space environment,” 
attempted to rally the international community in response, and endorsed 
the Code of Conduct as a mechanism that would “help maintain the long-
term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space.”223 This 
reception reflected President Obama’s 2008 campaign suggestion that “a 
Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations” was an expedient 
alternative to a formal treaty, which would, at the very least, “take a long 
time to negotiate.”224 But while the United States would both comply with 
the draft Code and help develop it further, it would not allow its space-
based military power to be meaningfully constrained “in any way.”225 The 
same day, the Department of State issued a fact sheet to explain its role and 
response.226 Like the Code’s preamble,227 it stressed the importance of the 
outer-space environment, the great threat posed by irresponsible conduct, 
and the necessity of international cooperation in outer space activities.228 
Dissent was inevitable. Soon, a hawkish conservative bloc publicly 
expressed its outrage over President Obama’s decision to abide by and help 
develop the draft Code of Conduct.229 In an editorial for the New York 
Times, John Bolton and John Yoo called the move “a transparent end run 
around the constitutional requirement that the Senate ratify all treaties.”230 
Bolton and Yoo clearly did not want such a treaty; it would, they alleged, 
trade “American security . . . for the false promise of global 
governance.”231 At any rate, they saw a treaty as “unlikely.”232 While their 
objections returned frequently to the President’s “eliminat[ion] of the 
 
 222.  Press Release, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, 
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (Jan. 17, 2012).  
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Senator Barack Obama, Response to Policy Questionnaire, Council for a Livable World, 
available at http://livableworld.org/assets/pdfs/2008_presidential_candidates_questionnaire 
_responses.pdf.  
 225.  Id.  
 226.  See Fact Sheet supra note 9, and accompanying text.  
 227.  See 2010 Draft, supra note 196, at 3.  
 228.  FACT SHEET, supra note 9.  
 229.  John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Hands off the Heavens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html.  
 230.  Id.  
 231.  Id.  
 232.  Id. They asserted that “Congress recognize[s] the national security threats,” but would 
“realize that America must not commit to military limitations in a rapidly changing field.” Id.  
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Senate’s important constitutional role,” Bolton and Yoo perceived a more 
far-reaching danger: the Code “would substantially impede advances in 
space technology because such innovations could also be labeled as 
military.”233 Some activities with which the Code of Conduct could 
potentially interfere would be of an inarguably martial nature; the United 
States might have difficulty “develop[ing] antiballistic missile systems in 
space, test[ing] antisatellite weapons[,] and gather[ing] intelligence.”234 
But, they added, debris-mitigation standards would limit not just “military 
activities in space,” but “some peaceful dual-use technologies, like the 
multistage rockets used to launch commercial satellites,” as well.235 
Furthermore, the U.S. “shouldn’t expect China to voluntarily accept limits 
on its space strategy.”236 Finally, they predicted that the United States’ 
numerous enemies would “exploit [the] ambiguity” in the Code’s self-
defense exception “to prevent legitimate American actions,” allowing the 
nation to respond only to “cross-border attacks.”237 For these reasons, they 
concluded that, instead of permitting the United States to comply with the 
Code, “[t]he Senate [should] defend its constitutional prerogatives by 
aggressively financing programs to advance [the American] lead in space 
and refusing to follow the administration’s foreign-policy lead.”238 In short, 
a strong return to Bush-era unipolarity in outer space would maximize 
American safety while “consensus through concession” would weaken it.239 
Wearily, the State Department submitted a letter to the New York 
Times editor, attempting to clarify some issues but failing to respond to 
most of Bolton’s and Yoo’s assertions.240 The letter ignored their better-
placed fears: incongruent behavior by foreign spacefaring powers, namely 
China; impediments to technological and scientific progress; and dramatic 
restrictions on military operations.241 Readers might infer from the State 
Department’s reference to the non-binding nature of the Code that other 
states’ ability to narrowly construe the self-defense exception was totally 
 
 233.  Id. However, Messrs. Bolton and Yoo explicitly disagree with my analysis, asserting that “the 
more far-reaching danger is,” in fact, “that Mr. Obama is eroding American sovereignty on the sly.” Id.  
 234.  Id.  
 235.  Id. Distressingly, these standards are “drafted by Europeans who do not bear America’s 
global responsibilities. . . . [T]here is little our little friends across the pond don’t want to regulate . . . .” 
Id.  
 236.  Id. Bolton and Yoo offer no explanation for this suspicion, but noted China’s successful 
deployment of an antisatellite weapon in 2007, and also that “it is deploying its own GPS system[, and 
i]n a war, China could potentially destroy [U.S.] satellites and still retain its own GPS capabilities.” Id.  
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id.  
 239.  See Burris, supra note 147, at 289. 
 240.  Gottemoeller, supra note 201.  
 241.  See id.  
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unchanged by it, but this, too, was not directly stated.242 In fact, the State 
Department letter only directly addressed the constitutional claims; it then 
attempted to raise awareness of the orbital-debris threat.243 It hinted at the 
dangers of a truly unipolar outer-space attitude, but still hedged, 
“Maintaining American leadership is absolutely critical.”244 But despite 
their bombastic rhetoric, Bolton and Yoo acknowledged problems that the 
State Department did not address—multistage rockets, for example, are 
generally regarded as the most economically efficient way to deliver 
objects to orbit, but “most of America’s space debris ‘comes from the 
upper stages of [satellite] launch vehicles.’”245 Regardless, the Department 
of State letter clearly reiterated the administration’s stance: the Code was 
“under development,” the U.S. would not sign on unless national security 
were to be “protect[ed] and enhance[d],” and, most importantly, “the code 
would not be legally binding.”246 But would it? Bolton and Yoo claimed 
that President Obama’s advisors and colleagues had, as academics, 
suggested that signing on to or complying with these types of codified best 
practices could “help[] form binding ‘customary international law.’”247 In 
fact, this is perhaps the safest, strongest, and even likeliest solution to the 
problem of outer-space security. 
V. HOW THEN SHALL WE LIVE? THE CODE’S POTENTIAL TO 
CRYSTALLIZE INTO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (CIL) 
If states recognize an international norm as an extensive, settled, and 
uniform practice, such that they—particularly where especially affected or 
burdened by it—treat it as obligatory, it becomes binding international 
law.248 Scholars theorize “that in the absence of a new outer space 
disarmament treaty, the world can productively turn to [CIL] as a viable 
alternative pathway.”249 Binding CIL has two primary elements: the 
objective “widespread, longstanding pattern of concordant state practice” 
and the subjective “attribut[ion of] that pattern of practice to a ‘sense of 
obligation,’ rather than merely to habit, courtesy, indifference, or political 
 
 242.  See id.  
 243.  See id.  
 244.  See id.  
 245.  Imburgia, supra note 28, at 605 (quoting Carl Hoffman, Battlefield Space, POPULAR 
MECHANICS, July 2007, at 81).  
 246.  Bolton & Yoo, supra note 228 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 28.  
 249.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1189; see, e.g., Taylor, supra note 12, at 28-30; Tannenwald, supra 
note 170, at 378-79, 404-05.  
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expediency.”250 Bolton and Yoo asserted that the president’s compliance 
with the Code of Conduct was in furtherance of CIL crystallization, though 
they concluded that “[t]he Constitution’s framers [had] sought to preclude 
such schemes through the treaty process.”251 
Since the 1950s, the outer-space “CIL avenue” evolved “more rapidly 
than the [corresponding] treaty mechanism.”252 No nation has ever attacked 
another using a kinetic ASAT.253 Before the Chinese ASAT test, even 
skeptics saw the moratorium on the use of weapons in outer space as “a 
widely supported norm of the international community.”254 Since then, the 
U.N.G.A. sought to promote peaceful use of, and prevent an arms race in, 
outer space, “bespeak[ing] a widespread consensus on the issue.”255 A 
number of states and NGOs have created guidelines and policies restricting 
unnecessary or intentional debris creation, high-risk maneuvers, simulated 
attacks, and DEW and kinetic ASAT use.256 These entities tend to prioritize 
international communication, consultation, registry, and enforcement 
standards.257 However, the use of ASATs since 2008 indicates “that 
consistent state practice has not yet solidified.”258 While many nations 
protested China’s ASAT test, only Japan actually called it illegal.259 
Therefore, “because of the lack of opinio juris, the emerging norm is not 
yet a binding obligation.”260 
Absent binding treaties or crystallized CIL explicitly forbidding 
destructive orbital activities, general CIL implicates broader principles, 
such as restraints on military activities that excessively or unnecessarily 
damage the environment.261 While war inevitably harms the environment, 
 
 250.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1223. 
 251.  Bolton & Yoo, supra note 228.  
 252.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1233-34. “Remarkably, the CIL version of the law of outer space 
would achieve even more comprehensive geographic coverage than the treaty version.” Id. at 1234.  
 253.  Id. at 1235. Furthermore, many states could have pursued ASAT technology but did not. Id. at 
1236.  
 254.  Tannenwald, supra note 170, at 414.  
 255.  GRAHAM, supra note 84, at 95.  
 256.  See, e.g., Paul B. Larsen, Guidelines for Military Activities in Outer Space, IISL-07-E6.5 
(2007); see also Taylor, supra note 12, at 32-41 (analyzing numerous sets of governmental guidelines 
and policies).  
 257.  See generally Larsen, supra note 254. 
 258.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 29 (“[N]o specific customary international law governs orbital 
debris.”).  
 259.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1237-42.  
 260.  Taylor, supra note 12, at 37.  
 261.  See, e.g., Tare Brisibe, Customary International Law, Arms Control, and the Environment in 
Outer Space, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 375, 391-92 (2009).  
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and “[o]uter space is no exception,”262 the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) opined that states’ necessity-and-proportionality calculations must 
include “environmental considerations.”263 The radioactivity of dozens of 
orbiting satellites, which could seriously contaminate the earth if struck, 
must surely factor into this equation.264 While the ICJ report considered not 
ASATs but nuclear weapons265—which, despite decades of international 
condemnation, are not banned under CIL266—and while the ICJ does not 
apply stare decisis, the Court does defer to definite CIL wherever found.267 
At any rate, this report reflects the same international sensibilities that 
forbid high-seas missile testing that interferes with navigation, fishing, or 
the environment,268 manifested most clearly in the “precautionary 
principle” of the Rio Declaration: “Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”269 
Opponents of the CIL crystallization theory assert that, because the 
Code is nonbinding, and states may, when it matters most, ignore even their 
own best practices, “[c]ustomary international law on space debris is never 
likely to develop.”270 Without a formal obligation, individual practices will 
probably not become uniform and settled, and states will probably not 
internalize a sense of obligation regarding the international standard.271 
Even before the Chinese ASAT test, scholars wondered at the practical 
strength of states’ “tradition of restraint.”272 Moreover, they worry that 
when followed, the Code would inappropriately interfere with “state[s’] 
legitimate rights and interests,” and when ignored, it would do nothing. 
China might subscribe, and then “flout[] the provisions” or otherwise 
 
 262.  Id. at 380.  
 263.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 242, ¶ 
30 (“Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is . . . 
necess[ar]y and proportiona[te].”) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion].  
 264.  See Taylor, supra note 12, at 23. 
 265.  See generally ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 261.  
 266.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1228.  
 267.  Id. at 1222.  
 268.  See Tannenwald, supra note 170, at 397.  
 269.  U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, at principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (1992). “The 
UNGA has also flatly asserted that ‘destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international law.’”; see also Koplow, supra 
note 13, at 1251. 
 270.  Imburgia, supra note 28, at 624-25. 
 271.  See id. 
 272.  E.g., Tannenwald, supra note 170, at 414. 
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“cheat on the arrangements,” perhaps inspiring Russia or India to follow 
suit.  At any rate, the Code lacks the legal framework and enforcement 
mechanisms to regulate its constituents or influence the numerous 
troublesome entities not yet on board.273 Other commentators fear 
successful Code crystallization, positing that CIL here inevitably “becomes 
the product of the will of one or two states.”274 
Instead, many advocate creation of a clear, binding international 
treaty, pursued by America and all spacefaring powers, and boasting “space 
situational awareness provisions” and “sound enforcement mechanisms” 
such as an international tribunal and Security Council participation.275 Even 
some American conservatives support what has traditionally been a left-
wing solution, arguing that “an ASAT treaty best safeguards the United 
States’ national security.”276 Most voices, regardless of political affiliation, 
seek a treaty that forbids space-based weapons and “interference with space 
assets.”277 (Alternatively, some suggest banning offensive weapons in outer 
space, but not defensive weapons, in order to let states “protect their 
investment and interests . . . without spurring a dangerous arms build-
up.”278 However, these commentators’ attempts to draw the necessary line 
between the two weapon types have been heretofore unconvincing.)279 
Although such a treaty would require the bilateral advice and consent of the 
Senate, a difficult and politically charged process at the best of times,280 
“both NASA and [the Department of Defense] are already required to 
minimize space debris, [and] the United States’ interests would be better 
served if an international agreement required other nations to do the 
same.”281 The greatest advantage of a binding treaty would be 
 
 273.  Rajeswari Rajagopalan, The Space Code of Conduct Debate: A View from Delhi, STRATEGIC 
STUDIES QUARTERLY, Spring 2012, at 137, 141-45 (describing “potential problem areas in the EU 
Code”). “China [might] pursue a public policy of condemning space weapons while secretly pursuing 
ASAT technologies.” Walsh, supra note 152, at 765.  
 274.  Zhang, supra note 13, at 455.  
 275.  E.g., Imburgia, supra note 28, at 631-34; see also Tannenwald, supra note 170, at 409, 417-
19. 
 276.  Walsh, supra note 152, at 764. “The United States should neutralize th[e ASAT] threat, even 
if it means signing a treaty that limits ‘its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space.’” Id. at 
798 (quoting U.S. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S. NATIONAL 
SPACE POLICY ¶ 2 (2006), THE WHITE HOUSE, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/microsites/ostp/national-space-policy-2006.pdf.  
 277.  Tannenwald, supra note 170, at 416.  
 278.  Barnet, supra note 41, at 289.  
 279.  See id. at 290 (discussing the necessity and difficulty of basing this distinction on a state’s 
intent and suggesting technical limitations on defensive weapons); see also Zhang, supra note 13, at 
448-49 (considering the offensive/defensive distinction).  
 280.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 281.  Imburgia, supra note 28, at 631.  
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institutionalized “monitoring, verification, and enforcement” systems. On-
site pre-launch verification regimes built on a rebuilt Registration 
Convention, for example, could limit ex ante nations’ chances to break the 
rules rather than punishing them ex post.282 Even if the most powerful 
spacefaring states somehow accepted a treaty, that treaty “would require 
many years to approach universality.” By contrast, the crystallized CIL 
would impact everyone the moment that it were recognized.283 
One last proposal: if the United States remained the only spacefaring 
power resistant to a binding treaty, the other states could create their own 
organization or treaty framework independent of the U.N.284 Such an 
alliance might “over-represent the interest of those with space capabilities 
at the expense of those without,” but it would grant legitimacy, efficiency, 
and enforcement to an area in dire need of all three.285 Even against the 
wishes of the United States, it might provide the lasting consensus—
alternatively, the “continuing pattern of self-restraint”—needed to incubate 
states’ individually voluntary practices into CIL.286 And if such a regime 
existed, the progressive public adoption of its standards by a single U.S. 
president might provide opinio juris such that anti-ASAT, anti-debris CIL 
would irreversibly crystallize.287 
CONCLUSION 
Even if states followed the Code of Conduct to the letter, creating a 
pattern of obligation that eventually crystallized into CIL, there is no 
mechanism for removing existing debris from orbit and heading off an 
increasingly likely cascade effect.288 At present, the international 
community has neither the willpower nor the technology to reverse the 
damage.289 
 
 282.  See Tannenwald, supra note 170, at 418-19 (discussing the advantages of a compliance 
regime over a deterrence regime); see also Walsh, supra note 152, at 787-93 (suggesting reliable, 
realistic treaty-based verification mechanisms); contra Rajagopalan, supra note 271, at 145 (“There is 
no good way to verify space technologies, given that they are inherently dual-use in nature.”).  
 283.  Koplow, supra note 13, at 1267.  
 284.  See Zhang, supra note 13, at 457 (suggesting a “private organization of space powers” that 
does not include the United States for the purpose of monitoring each other and developing an 
“international framework for the use of outer space”).  
 285.  Id.  
 286.  See Koplow, supra note 13, at 1270-71. 
 287.  See id. at 1269-70 (describing how one U.S. president’s acceptance of anti-ASAT CIL would 
effectively bind his or her predecessors regardless of their stance on the issue).  
 288.  See Imburgia, supra note 28, at 625-26 (stating that the U.N. General Assembly’s nonbinding 
debris mitigation guidelines do not address the challenge of debris removal). 
 289.  See generally supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (describing myriad dangers of outer 
space debris accumulation); see also Taylor, supra note 12, at 19 (“[R]emediation measures are 
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But satellites are, if nothing else, expensive and hard to do without. 
The world’s great spacefaring powers do not want to risk theirs. While the 
Bush-era outer-space policy may have indeed inspired an arms race, it also 
turned international eyes toward the importance and the fragility of outer-
space assets. The same faltering globalized economy and resulting 
multipolarity that preclude actual armed attacks may inspire new heights of 
cooperative debris mitigation and information-sharing, or perhaps red 
balance sheets will keep nations focused on the down-to-earth until it is too 
late to prepare for tomorrow. Regardless, the Code of Conduct, voluntary 
or not, is a step toward consensus. It does not need to shout to succeed; it 
can be a reference point for treaties or crystallizing CIL or perpetually non-
binding best practices. But the Code must not be all that there is. At best, it 
must be, like the OST, or the U.N. Charter, or the Magna Carta, one more 
agreed-upon step toward necessity. 
 
 
currently economically or technologically unfeasible.”); Imburgia, supra note 28, at 628(“The only 
cost-effective option is to move defunct GEO satellites into ‘graveyard orbits’ . . . . [Even] this solution 
fails to offer long-term relief; it only rearranges the chairs on the deck of the titanic space debris 
problem.”).  
